{"repo":"NousResearch/hermes-agent","public_id":"126755","display_label":"A2A callback SSRF bypass and address validation fixes","summary":"These members concern a security vulnerability in A2A push-callback handling where SSRF protections can be bypassed via DNS names, non-standard IPv4 representations, or HTTP redirects. The group includes the issue report and associated fixes to strengthen callback origin and address validation.","subsystem":"agent","counts":{"members":3,"open_issues":1,"open_issues_distinct":1,"open_prs":2,"closed_issues":0,"merged_prs":0,"attempt_prs":2},"landed_fix":null,"resolution":{"state":"unresolved","by":null},"freshness":{"state":"never_verified","last_verified_at":null,"is_stale":false},"grouping":{"backbone":"STRUCTURAL_SPANNING","link_density":0.6666666666666666},"fix_edges":[],"members":[{"kind":"issue","number":126755,"title":"[Security] A2A push-callback SSRF guard is bypassable by DNS names, integer-form IPv4, and HTTP redirects","url":null,"state":"open"},{"kind":"pr","number":126814,"title":"fix(a2a): reject internal callback addresses in every spelling","url":null,"state":"open","close_reason":{"refs":[{"kind":"commit","value":"3ea81ab14710","number":0}],"category":"uncategorized","implication":"needs_llm"},"merged":false},{"kind":"pr","number":129793,"title":"fix(a2a): keep callback delivery on validated origins","url":null,"state":"open","close_reason":{"category":"silent_close","implication":"active"},"merged":false}],"trust":{"default_tier":"verified","includes_suggested":false}}