SQL injection risk and multi-platform bug fixes
Cluster 1911 · agent. Data as of
Nothing open on GitHub. Fix merged in #2061 on 19 Mar 2026. Check it covers your case.
The short answer
- Known?
- Yes. 3 related items grouped here, 1 issue already closed.
- Fix event
- A fix was merged to main in PR #2061. Check it covers your case. No release data is tracked.
- Tracker
- The maintainers' tracker marks this
resolved, deciding PR #2061. That is separate from the fix event. - Still open
- Nothing open on GitHub.
These items address a potential SQL injection vulnerability in execute() calls via string formatting, along with a broader fix touching Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, and rate limiting concerns. The SQL security issue is the clearest shared theme, with the third item bundling several unrelated platform fixes.
Open issues0
Open PRs0
Fixes on record
-
#2061 fix(security): eliminate SQL string formatting in execute() calls
files:
agent/insights.py,hermes_state.py,tests/test_sql_injection.pyShow the diff
-
agent/insights.py@@ -181,22 +181,25 @@ def generate(self, days: int = 30, source: str = None) -> Dict[str, Any]: "billing_base_url, billing_mode, estimated_cost_usd, " "actual_cost_usd, cost_status, cost_source") + # Pre-computed query strings — f-string evaluated once at class definition, + # not at runtime, so no user-controlled value can alter the query structure. + _GET_SESSIONS_WITH_SOURCE = ( + f"SELECT {_SESSION_COLS} FROM sessions" + " WHERE started_at >= ? AND source = ?" + " ORDER BY started_at DESC" + ) + _GET_SESSIONS_ALL = ( + f"SELECT {_SESSION_COLS} FROM sessions" + " WHERE started_at >= ?" + " ORDER BY started_at DESC" + ) + def _get_sessions(self, cutoff: float, source: str = None) -> List[Dict]: """Fetch sessions within the time window.""" if source: - cursor = self._conn.execute( - f"""SELECT {self._SESSION_COLS} FROM sessions - WHERE started_at >= ? AND source = ? - ORDER BY started_at DESC""", - (cutoff, source), - ) + cursor = self._conn.execute(self._GET_SESSIONS_WITH_SOURCE, (cutoff, source)) else: - cursor = self._conn.execute( - f"""SELECT {self._SESSION_COLS} FROM sessions - WHERE started_at >= ? - ORDER BY started_at DESC""", - (cutoff,), - ) + cursor = self._conn.execute(self._GET_SESSIONS_ALL, (cutoff,)) return [dict(row) for row in cursor.fetchall()] def _get_tool_usage(self, cutoff: float, source: str = None) -> List[Dict]: -
hermes_state.py@@ -181,7 +181,11 @@ def _init_schema(self): ] for name, column_type in new_columns: try: - cursor.execute(f"ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN {name} {column_type}") + # name and column_type come from the hardcoded tuple above, + # not user input. Double-quote identifier escaping is applied + # as defense-in-depth; SQLite DDL cannot be parameterized. + safe_name = name.replace('"', '""') + cursor.execute(f'ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN "{safe_name}" {column_type}') except sqlite3.OperationalError: pass cursor.execute("UPDATE schema_version SET version = 5") -
tests/test_sql_injection.py@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +"""Tests that verify SQL injection mitigations in insights and state modules.""" + +import re + +from agent.insights import InsightsEngine + + +def test_session_cols_no_injection_chars(): + """_SESSION_COLS must not contain SQL injection vectors.""" + cols = InsightsEngine._SESSION_COLS + assert ";" not in cols + assert "--" not in cols + assert "'" not in cols + assert "DROP" not in cols.upper() + + +def test_get_sessions_all_query_is_parameterized(): + """_GET_SESSIONS_ALL must use a ? placeholder for the cutoff value.""" + query = InsightsEngine._GET_SESSIONS_ALL + assert "?" in query + assert "started_at >= ?" in query + # Must not embed any runtime-variable content via brace interpolation + assert "{" not in query + + +def test_get_sessions_with_source_query_is_parameterized(): + """_GET_SESSIONS_WITH_SOURCE must use ? placeholders for both parameters.""" + query = InsightsEngine._GET_SESSIONS_WITH_SOURCE + assert query.count("?") == 2 + assert "started_at >= ?" in query + assert "source = ?" in query + assert "{" not in query + + +def test_session_col_names_are_safe_identifiers(): + """Every column name listed in _SESSION_COLS must be a simple identifier.""" + cols = InsightsEngine._SESSION_COLS + identifiers = [c.strip() for c in cols.split(",")] + safe_identifier = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$") + for col in identifiers: + assert safe_identifier.match(col), ( + f"Column name {col!r} is not a safe SQL identifier" + )
-
1 PR closed without merging
From the close comments: other 1
-
#2032 Fix 5 high-impact issues: SQL security, Discord threads, Slack context, WhatsApp delivery, rate limit UX · other →
#1911,#2011,#1826,#2724,#1953,#1945
Closed issues · 1
- Closed#1911[Security] possible SQL injection via string formatting in execute()
How this cluster was grouped
-
Link evidence (
structural links throughout): every member is connected by structural evidence: shared changed files, or a closing/superseded reference. -
Pairwise link density
0.67: the share of item pairs that carry a link, counting a structural link in full and a relevance-only link at 0.36.1.00means every pair is linked.
Pick up a Lab task
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Open the LabAt a glance
- Subsystem
- agent
- Merged PRs
- #2061
- Closed issues
- 1
- Attempts
- 1 PR closed without merging
- Fix link checked
- 19 Mar 2026. This confirmation is old and may be out of date (a revert or reopen would not have invalidated it here); re-verify.