Vision image-source resolution and Docker backend patch

Fixes on record

Merged to main. A stamp counts the issues a fix is linked to.

• #57890 fix(vision): unified image-source resolver + terminal-backend confinement

  merged to main

  files: scripts/release.py, tests/integration/test_vision_docker_resolve.py, tests/tools/test_image_source.py, tests/tools/test_vision_native_fast_path.py, tests/tools/test_vision_tools.py, tools/credential_files.py, tools/image_source.py, tools/vision_tools.py

  Show the diff

  • scripts/release.py

    @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
     
     # Auto-extracted from noreply emails + manual overrides
     AUTHOR_MAP = {
    +    "[redacted:email]": "JAlmanzarMint",  # PR #52688 salvage (vision: rasterize SVG / re-encode unsupported raster formats to PNG before embedding), folded into #57890
         "[redacted:email]": "ooiuuii",  # PR #58466/#58377 salvage (redact: fireworks fw-/fpk_ prefixes; telegram: redact bot tokens out of transport error strings)
         "[redacted:email]": "msh01",  # PR #58250 salvage (telegram: wall-clock init timeout via daemon-thread deadline + abandon the shielded initialize task on timeout so the retry ladder advances instead of hanging on attempt 1/8 under s6 supervision; #58236). Also covers PR #58276 salvage (compression: preserve a real user turn after compaction; #55677).
         "[redacted:email]": "danilofalcao",  # PR #56674 salvage (update: skip unsupported platform.matrix lazy refresh on native Windows — python-olm has no Windows wheel)

  • tests/integration/test_vision_docker_resolve.py

    @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
    +"""Docker integration tests for the vision image-source resolver.
    +
    +Exercises the in-sandbox exec-read path that unit tests can only mock. Two
    +scenarios that ONLY the container filesystem can serve:
    +
    +  * a tmpfs ``/workspace`` file with no host path at all, and
    +  * a root-owned mode-600 file the host user cannot read,
    +
    +both delivered by the resolver's ``base64`` exec-read fallback
    +(``tools/image_source._resolve_container_fallback``). This is the same path
    +that provides terminal-backend confinement for GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq: under a
    +non-local backend a non-cache path is read INSIDE the container, never on the
    +host.
    +
    +Gating follows the repo convention: the ``integration`` marker excludes these
    +from the default suite (``addopts = -m 'not integration'`` in pyproject.toml);
    +they run under ``pytest -m integration`` when a Docker daemon is available and
    +skip cleanly when it is not. Container spin-up exceeds the 30s suite default,
    +so the timeout is bumped to 180s.
    +
    +Run:  pytest -m integration tests/integration/test_vision_docker_resolve.py
    +"""
    +import base64
    +import shutil
    +import subprocess
    +
    +import pytest
    +
    +
    +def _docker_available() -> bool:
    +    """True iff a docker CLI is on PATH and the daemon answers."""
    +    if shutil.which("docker") is None:
    +        return False
    +    try:
    +        return subprocess.run(
    +            ["docker", "info"], capture_output=True, timeout=5
    +        ).returncode == 0
    +    except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError):
    +        return False
    +
    +
    +pytestmark = [
    +    pytest.mark.integration,
    +    pytest.mark.timeout(180),
    +    pytest.mark.skipif(not _docker_available(), reason="Docker daemon not available"),
    +]
    +
    +# A real 1x1 PNG.
    +_TINY_PNG = base64.b64decode(
    +    "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
    +)
    +
    +
    [redacted:email]
    +def docker_backend(request, monkeypatch):
    +    """A live DockerEnvironment registered so ``get_active_env`` finds it.
    +
    +    Unique task_id per test: DockerEnvironment derives the container name from
    +    the task_id, so a shared id would make one test's teardown remove the
    +    other's container.
    +    """
    +    from tools import terminal_tool
    +    from tools.environments import docker as docker_env
    +
    +    # The resolver keys the exec-read off TERMINAL_ENV=docker.
    +    monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +
    +    task_id = f"vision-docker-resolve-{request.node.name}"
    +    env = docker_env.DockerEnvironment(
    +        image="python:3.11-slim",
    +        cwd="/workspace",
    +        timeout=120,
    +        task_id=task_id,
    +        volumes=[],
    +        network=False,
    +    )
    +    # Register under the raw task_id; get_active_env() falls back to the raw
    +    # key after trying the _resolve_container_task_id() mapping.
    +    with terminal_tool._env_lock:
    +        terminal_tool._active_environments[task_id] = env
    +    try:
    +        env._task_id = task_id
    +        yield env
    +    finally:
    +        with terminal_tool._env_lock:
    +            terminal_tool._active_environments.pop(task_id, None)
    +        try:
    +            env.cleanup()
    +        except Exception:
    +            pass
    +
    +
    +def _write_png_in_container(env, path, *, mode=None):
    +    b64 = base64.b64encode(_TINY_PNG).decode()
    +    cmd = f"printf %s {b64} | base64 -d > {path}"
    +    if mode:
    +        cmd += f" && chmod {mode} {path}"
    +    res = env.execute(cmd)
    +    assert res.get("returncode", 1) == 0, res
    +
    +
    [redacted:email]
    +async def test_resolves_tmpfs_workspace_file(docker_backend):
    +    """A container-only path (no host file) is delivered via exec-read."""
    +    from tools.image_source import ResolveContext, resolve_image_source
    +
    +    _write_png_in_container(docker_backend, "/workspace/shot.png")
    +    res = await resolve_image_source(
    +        "/workspace/shot.png", ResolveContext(task_id=docker_backend._task_id))
    +    assert res.origin == "container"
    +    assert res.mime == "image/png"
    +    assert res.data == _TINY_PNG
    +
    +
    [redacted:email]
    +async def test_resolves_root_owned_mode600_file(docker_backend):
    +    """Root-owned mode-600 (host user can't read it) is served in-container."""
    +    from tools.image_source import ResolveContext, resolve_image_source
    +
    +    _write_png_in_container(docker_backend, "/workspace/secret.png", mode="600")
    +    res = await resolve_image_source(
    +        "/workspace/secret.png", ResolveContext(task_id=docker_backend._task_id))
    +    assert res.origin == "container"
    +    assert res.mime == "image/png"
    +    assert res.data == _TINY_PNG
    +
    +
    [redacted:email]
    +async def test_host_secret_path_reads_container_not_host(docker_backend, tmp_path):
    +    """The GHSA-gpxw invariant, end-to-end against real Docker.
    +
    +    A path that exists on the HOST with secret bytes but does NOT exist in the
    +    container must resolve to the container read (which fails to find it) —
    +    never to the host bytes. Proves vision cannot exfiltrate a host file under
    +    a sandbox backend even when the exact path is real on the host.
    +    """
    +    from tools.image_source import (
    +        ImageResolutionError,
    +        ResolveContext,
    +        resolve_image_source,
    +    )
    +
    +    # A real host file outside any media cache, holding a secret.
    +    host_secret = [redacted:secret-assignment] / "id_rsa"
    +    host_secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK")
    +
    +    # That path does not exist inside the fresh container, so the exec-read
    +    # finds nothing and the resolver refuses. The exact failure shape depends
    +    # on the container's base64 build (some exit non-zero -> SourceNotFound,
    +    # some print an error to stderr and exit 0 with empty stdout -> NotAnImage);
    +    # both are ImageResolutionError. What matters for GHSA-gpxw: the resolver
    +    # never returns the HOST bytes.
    +    with pytest.raises(ImageResolutionError) as excinfo:
    +        await resolve_image_source(
    +            str(host_secret), ResolveContext(task_id=docker_backend._task_id))
    +    # Belt and suspenders: the host secret must not appear anywhere in the error.
    +    assert b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY".decode() not in str(excinfo.value)

  • tests/tools/test_image_source.py

    @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
    +"""Tests for tools/image_source.py — the unified vision image-source resolver.
    +
    +Covers the delivery contract (data:/http/file/local/container source handling,
    +size cap, magic-byte sniff) AND the terminal-backend confinement security model
    +(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): under a non-local backend, host reads are confined to the
    +media caches and every other path is read inside the sandbox via exec-read.
    +"""
    +
    +import base64
    +import importlib
    +from pathlib import Path
    +from types import SimpleNamespace
    +from unittest.mock import patch
    +
    +import pytest
    +
    +
    +PNG = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 64
    +JPEG = b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 64
    +
    +
    +def _reload(monkeypatch, hermes_home: Path):
    +    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
    +    import hermes_constants
    +    importlib.reload(hermes_constants)
    +    import tools.image_source as isrc
    +    importlib.reload(isrc)
    +    return isrc
    +
    +
    +class TestDataUrl:
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_valid_data_url_resolves_to_bytes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
    +        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(
    +            f"data:image/png;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
    +        assert res.data == PNG
    +        assert res.mime == "image/png"
    +        assert res.origin == "data"
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_non_image_data_url_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        b64 = base64.b64encode(b"not an image").decode()
    +        with pytest.raises(isrc.NotAnImage):
    +            await isrc.resolve_image_source(
    +                f"data:text/plain;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
    +
    +
    +class TestLocalBackend:
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_local_backend_reads_any_host_path(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
    +        img = tmp_path / "outside" / "pic.png"
    +        img.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
    +        img.write_bytes(PNG)
    +        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(img), isrc.ResolveContext())
    +        assert res.data == PNG
    +        assert res.origin == "file"
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_file_uri_scheme_stripped(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
    +        img = tmp_path / "pic.jpg"
    +        img.write_bytes(JPEG)
    +        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(f"file://{img}", isrc.ResolveContext())
    +        assert res.mime == "image/jpeg"
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_bare_relative_path_resolves(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """A cwd-relative bare filename ('pic.png') is a valid local source —
    +        main accepted it; the resolver must not regress it (PR review)."""
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
    +        img = tmp_path / "pic.png"
    +        img.write_bytes(PNG)
    +        monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
    +        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source("pic.png", isrc.ResolveContext())
    +        assert res.data == PNG
    +        assert res.origin == "file"
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_unknown_url_scheme_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
    +        with pytest.raises(isrc.UnsupportedScheme):
    +            await isrc.resolve_image_source(
    +                "ftp://example.com/pic.png", isrc.ResolveContext())
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_svg_passes_through_for_rasterization(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """SVG has no raster magic bytes but is passed through with mime
    +        image/svg+xml so the vision call sites can rasterize it to PNG."""
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
    +        svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
    +        svg_bytes = b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>'
    +        svg.write_bytes(svg_bytes)
    +        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(svg), isrc.ResolveContext())
    +        assert res.mime == "image/svg+xml"
    +        assert res.data == svg_bytes
    +
    +
    +class TestNonLocalBackendConfinement:
    +    """The security model: under a sandbox backend, host reads are confined to
    +    the media caches; every other path is read inside the sandbox."""
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_media_cache_path_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +        cached = home / "cache" / "images" / "inbound.png"
    +        cached.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
    +        cached.write_bytes(PNG)
    +        # No sandbox env needed — a cache path is host-read directly.
    +        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(cached), isrc.ResolveContext())
    +        assert res.data == PNG
    +        assert res.origin == "file"
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_host_secret_outside_cache_routes_to_sandbox_not_host(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """A non-cache host path (e.g. /etc/passwd) must NOT be host-read — it
    +        routes to the in-sandbox exec-read, which reads the CONTAINER's file."""
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +
    +        # A real host file outside the caches, holding a "secret".
    +        secret = [redacted:secret-assignment] / "id_rsa"
    +        secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK")
    +
    +        # Fake sandbox env: its exec-read returns a *different* (container) image,
    +        # proving we read the container filesystem, not the host secret.
    +        container_png_b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
    +        calls = {}
    +
    +        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
    +            calls["cmd"] = cmd
    +            return {"returncode": 0, "output": container_png_b64}
    +
    +        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
    +                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
    +            res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
    +
    +        # Read came from the sandbox exec-read, returning the container image —
    +        # the host secret bytes never appear.
    +        assert res.origin == "container"
    +        assert res.data == PNG
    +        assert b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY" not in res.data
    +        assert "head -c" in calls["cmd"] and "< " in calls["cmd"]  # bounded, redirect-safe form
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_non_cache_path_fails_closed_without_sandbox(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """No active sandbox env -> refuse rather than fall back to a host read."""
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +        secret = [redacted:secret-assignment] / "id_rsa"
    +        secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
    +
    +        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
    +            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
    +                await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_symlink_in_cache_pointing_outside_is_not_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """A symlink planted inside a cache dir that points at a host secret must
    +        not be host-read (resolve() escapes the cache) — it routes to sandbox."""
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +        secret = [redacted:secret-assignment] / "outside" / "id_rsa"
    +        secret.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
    +        secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
    +        cache_dir = home / "cache" / "images"
    +        cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
    +        link = cache_dir / "sneaky.png"
    +        try:
    +            link.symlink_to(secret)
    +        except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
    +            pytest.skip("symlinks unsupported")
    +
    +        # Fails closed (no sandbox) rather than host-reading the symlink target.
    +        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
    +            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
    +                await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(link), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
    +
    +
    +class TestExecReadSafety:
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_exec_read_is_bounded_and_redirect_safe(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """Leading-dash paths go through an input redirect (no argv exposure)
    +        and the read is size-bounded via head -c."""
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +        captured = {}
    +
    +        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
    +            captured["cmd"] = cmd
    +            return {"returncode": 0, "output": base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()}
    +
    +        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
    +                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
    +            await isrc.resolve_image_source(
    +                "/workspace/-i-etc-shadow.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
    +        assert f"head -c {isrc._MAX_INGEST_BYTES + 1} < " in captured["cmd"]
    +        assert "'-i-etc-shadow.png'" in captured["cmd"] or "-i-etc-shadow.png" in captured["cmd"]
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_exec_read_over_cap_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        """A sandbox file larger than the ingest cap is rejected, not embedded."""
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +        # head -c returns cap+1 bytes for an oversized file.
    +        over = base64.b64encode(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * (isrc._MAX_INGEST_BYTES - 7)).decode()
    +
    +        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
    +            return {"returncode": 0, "output": over}
    +
    +        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
    +                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
    +            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceTooLarge):
    +                await isrc.resolve_image_source(
    +                    "/workspace/huge.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_exec_read_nonzero_returncode_raises(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
    +
    +        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
    +            return {"returncode": 1, "output": ""}
    +
    +        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
    +                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
    +            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
    +                await isrc.resolve_image_source(
    +                    "/workspace/nope.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
    +
    +
    +class TestSvgNormalization:
    +    """SVG resolves end-to-end: the resolver passes it through as
    +    image/svg+xml and the vision call sites rasterize it to PNG via
    +    _normalize_to_supported_image (PR #52688, folded in)."""
    +
    +    @pytest.mark.asyncio
    +    async def test_svg_rasterized_when_converter_available(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        from tools import vision_tools as vt
    +        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
    +        svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
    +        svg.write_bytes(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="4" height="4"/>')
    +
    +        def fake_rasterize(svg_path, out_path):
    +            out_path.write_bytes(PNG)
    +            return True
    +
    +        with patch.object(vt, "_rasterize_svg_to_png", side_effect=fake_rasterize):
    +            res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(svg), isrc.ResolveContext())
    +            assert res.mime == "image/svg+xml"
    +            path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(svg, "image/svg+xml")
    +        assert err is None
    +        assert mime == "image/png"
    +        assert path.read_bytes() == PNG
    +        path.unlink()
    +
    +    def test_svg_actionable_error_when_no_converter(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    +        from tools import vision_tools as vt
    +        _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
    +        svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
    +        svg.write_bytes(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>')
    +        with patch.object(vt, "_rasterize_svg_to_png", return_value=False):
    +            path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(svg, "image/svg+xml")
    +        assert path is None
    +        assert "rasterizer" in err

  • tests/tools/test_vision_native_fast_path.py

    @@ -119,7 +119,9 @@ def test_missing_file_returns_error_string(self, tmp_path):
             assert isinstance(result, str)
             parsed = json.loads(result)
             assert parsed.get("success") is False
    -        assert "Invalid image source" in parsed.get("error", "")
    +        # Unified resolver: local backend reports a clean not-found.
    +        err = parsed.get("error", "").lower()
    +        assert "image file not found" in err or "no active sandbox" in err
     
         def test_empty_image_url_returns_error(self):
             result = asyncio.get_event_loop().run_until_complete(

  • tests/tools/test_vision_tools.py

    @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
     """Tests for tools/vision_tools.py — URL validation, type hints, error logging."""
     
    +import base64
     import json
     import logging
     import os
    @@ -381,26 +382,20 @@ async def test_analysis_error_logs_exc_info(self, caplog):
         @pytest.mark.asyncio
         async def test_cleanup_error_logs_exc_info(self, tmp_path, caplog):
             """Temp file cleanup failure should log warning with exc_info."""
    -        # Create a real temp file that will be "downloaded"
    -        temp_dir = tmp_path / "temp_vision_images"
    -        temp_dir.mkdir()
    -
    -        async def fake_download(url, dest, max_retries=3):
    -            """Simulate download by writing file to the expected destination."""
    -            dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    -            dest.write_bytes(b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 16)
    -            return dest
    +        # A data: URL resolves to bytes without any network, materializes to a
    +        # vision temp file, then the analysis runs — exercising the temp-cleanup
    +        # path in the finally block. A tiny valid JPEG (magic bytes) passes the
    +        # resolver's magic-byte sniff.
    +        jpeg_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 32).decode("ascii")
    +        data_url = f"data:image/jpeg;base64,{jpeg_b64}"
     
             with (
    -            patch("tools.vision_tools._validate_image_url_async", new_callable=AsyncMock, return_value=True),
    -            patch("tools.vision_tools._download_image", side_effect=fake_download),
                 patch(
                     "tools.vision_tools._image_to_base64_data_url",
                     return_value="",
                 ),
                 caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="tools.vision_tools"),
             ):
    -            # Mock the async_call_llm function to return a mock response
                 mock_response = MagicMock()
                 mock_choice = MagicMock()
                 mock_choice.message.content = "A test image description"
    @@ -409,16 +404,12 @@ async def fake_download(url, dest, max_retries=3):
                 with (
                     patch("tools.vision_tools.async_call_llm", new_callable=AsyncMock, return_value=mock_response),
                 ):
    -                # Make unlink fail to trigger cleanup warning
    -                original_unlink = Path.unlink
    -
    +                # Make unlink fail to trigger the cleanup warning.
                     def failing_unlink(self, *args, **kwargs):
                         raise PermissionError("no permission")
     
                     with patch.object(Path, "unlink", failing_unlink):
    -                    result = await vision_analyze_tool(
    -                        "https://example.com/tempimg.jpg", "describe", "test/model"
    -                    )
    +                    result = await vision_analyze_tool(data_url, "describe", "test/model")
     
                 warning_records = [
                     r
    @@ -500,7 +491,8 @@ async def test_local_non_image_file_rejected_before_llm_call(self, tmp_path):
                 result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool(str(secret), "extract text"))
     
             assert result["success"] is False
    -        assert "Only real image files are supported" in result["error"]
    +        # The unified resolver's magic-byte sniff rejects non-images.
    +        assert "not a recognized image" in result["error"]
             mock_llm.assert_not_awaited()
     
         @pytest.mark.asyncio
    @@ -513,8 +505,8 @@ async def test_blocked_remote_url_short_circuits_before_download(self):
             }
     
             with (
    -            patch("tools.vision_tools.check_website_access", return_value=blocked),
    -            patch("tools.vision_tools._validate_image_url_async", new_callable=AsyncMock, return_value=True),
    +            patch("tools.website_policy.check_website_access", return_value=blocked),
    +            patch("tools.url_safety.is_safe_url", return_value=True),
                 patch("tools.vision_tools._download_image", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_download,
             ):
                 result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool("https://blocked.test/cat.png", "describe"))
    @@ -1258,7 +1250,7 @@ def slow_encode(path, mime_type=None):
                         enc_inflight -= 1
                 return ""
     
    -        async def fake_native(image_url, question):
    +        async def fake_native(image_url, question, task_id=None):
                 nonlocal calls_inflight, calls_peak
                 calls_inflight += 1
                 calls_peak = max(calls_peak, calls_inflight)

  • tools/credential_files.py

    @@ -402,6 +402,30 @@ def map_cache_path_to_container(
         return None
     
     
    +def from_agent_visible_cache_path(
    +    container_path: str,
    +    container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
    +) -> str:
    +    """Translate a sandbox/container cache path back to its host path.
    +
    +    Inverse of :func:`to_agent_visible_cache_path`. Returns the input unchanged
    +    when the active backend is not Docker, or when the path is not under any
    +    auto-mounted cache directory — the caller then treats a still-container
    +    path as "no host file" and falls back to an in-container read.
    +    """
    +    if os.environ.get("TERMINAL_ENV", "local") != "docker":
    +        return container_path
    +
    +    path = Path(container_path)
    +    for mount in get_cache_directory_mounts(container_base=container_base):
    +        try:
    +            rel = path.relative_to(mount["container_path"])
    +        except ValueError:
    +            continue
    +        return str(Path(mount["host_path"]) / rel)
    +    return container_path
    +
    +
     def to_agent_visible_cache_path(
         host_path: str,
         container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",

  • tools/image_source.py

    @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
    +"""Single resolver for every vision_analyze image source -> bytes + mime.
    +
    +All source handling (data:/http(s)/file/local/container) funnels through
    +:func:`resolve_image_source` so size and magic-byte checks are enforced exactly
    +once.  Returns raw bytes (not a path): the downstream step is base64 -> data URL
    +(RFC 2397) and provider base64 content blocks.
    +
    +Security (terminal-backend confinement, GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): under a non-local
    +terminal backend the file tools are confined to the sandbox (SECURITY.md 2.2),
    +but vision read images host-side. This resolver enforces the same boundary:
    +
    +  * local backend            -> read any host path (chosen posture, unchanged)
    +  * non-local backend:
    +      path in a media cache   -> host-read (the gateway/download caches live on
    +                                 the host and are bind-mounted into the sandbox)
    +      path anywhere else      -> read the bytes *inside the sandbox* via exec-read
    +                                 (the agent can already ``cat`` any container file;
    +                                 this stays within the sandbox boundary and never
    +                                 reaches the host's ``/etc/passwd`` / ``~/.ssh``).
    +
    +So a prompt-injected ``vision_analyze('/etc/passwd')`` under Docker reads the
    +*container's* file (what every other tool sees), not the host's — no escape —
    +while container-only images (tmpfs ``/workspace``, root-owned) are still
    +deliverable. This is the unified delivery + confinement model: the same
    +mechanism that fixes "vision can't see container files" also closes the escape.
    +"""
    +from __future__ import annotations
    +
    +import asyncio
    +import base64
    +import os
    +import re
    +from dataclasses import dataclass
    +from pathlib import Path
    +from typing import Optional
    +
    +# Raw-bytes INGEST budget — what the resolver will load before handing off.
    +# This is deliberately the 50MB download cap (tools/vision_tools._VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES),
    +# NOT the 20MB provider payload cap. The 20MB cap (_MAX_BASE64_BYTES) is a
    +# *post-resize* limit enforced at the call sites: an oversized raw image must
    +# still reach the resizer so it can be downscaled under the payload cap. Capping
    +# raw bytes at 20MB here would reject every 20-50MB photo before resize can run.
    +_MAX_INGEST_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024
    +
    +
    +class ImageResolutionError(Exception):
    +    def __init__(self, message: str, *, src: str = "", origin: str = ""):
    +        super().__init__(message)
    +        self.src, self.origin = src, origin
    +
    +
    +class UnsupportedScheme(ImageResolutionError):
    +    pass
    +
    +
    +class SourceUnsafe(ImageResolutionError):  # SSRF / path-allowlist
    +    pass
    +
    +
    +class SourceTooLarge(ImageResolutionError):
    +    pass
    +
    +
    +class SourceNotFound(ImageResolutionError):
    +    pass
    +
    +
    +class NotAnImage(ImageResolutionError):
    +    pass
    +
    +
    +@dataclass
    +class ResolveContext:
    +    task_id: Optional[str] = None
    +
    +
    +@dataclass
    +class ResolvedImage:
    +    data: bytes
    +    mime: str
    +    origin: str  # one of: data | http | file | local | container
    +
    +
    +# Explicit URL scheme, e.g. "ftp://", "s3://". Bare Windows drive paths
    +# ("C:\x.png") don't match because they lack the "//".
    +_SCHEME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.\-]*://")
    +
    +
    +async def resolve_image_source(src: str, ctx: ResolveContext) -> ResolvedImage:
    +    if not isinstance(src, str) or not src.strip():
    +        raise SourceNotFound("image_url is required", src=str(src))
    +    s = src.strip()
    +    if s.startswith("data:"):
    +        data, mime = _resolve_data_url(s)
    +        return _finalize(data, mime, "data", s)
    +    if s.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
    +        reason = _http_block_reason(s)
    +        if reason:
    +            raise SourceUnsafe(reason, src=s)
    +        return _finalize(await _download_to_bytes(s), "", "http", s)
    +
    +    if _SCHEME_RE.match(s) and not s.lower().startswith("file://"):
    +        raise UnsupportedScheme(
    +            "Unrecognized image source scheme. Use an http(s) URL, a local "
    +            "file path, a file:// URI, or a data: URL.",
    +            src=s,
    +        )
    +
    +    # Everything else is a filesystem path — including bare relative names
    +    # like "pic.png" (accepted on main; a path-shape gate here regressed them).
    +    candidate = s[len("file://"):] if s.lower().startswith("file://") else s
    +    p = Path(os.path.expanduser(candidate))
    +    # Confinement decision (see module docstring). Under a non-local backend
    +    # a path is host-readable ONLY if it lands in a media cache (after
    +    # translating a container-visible cache path back to its host mount);
    +    # every other path is read inside the sandbox via exec-read, so a host
    +    # path outside the caches never yields the host's bytes.
    +    host_target = _permitted_host_read_target(p, ctx)
    +    if host_target is not None and host_target.is_file():
    +        data = await asyncio.to_thread(host_target.read_bytes)
    +        return _finalize(data, "", "file", s)
    +    if _is_local_terminal_backend():
    +        # Local backend: any path was host-readable, so a miss simply means
    +        # the file doesn't exist — no sandbox to fall back to.
    +        raise SourceNotFound(f"image file not found: '{p}'", src=s, origin="file")
    +    # Not a permitted host read (or the host file is absent) -> read the
    +    # bytes inside the sandbox. Under a sandbox this reads the container's
    +    # filesystem, never the host's.
    +    return await _resolve_container_fallback(p, ctx, s)
    +
    +
    +def _resolve_data_url(s: str) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
    +    header, _, payload = s.partition(",")
    +    if ";base64" not in header:
    +        raise NotAnImage("data: URL must be base64-encoded", src=s[:64])
    +    declared = header[len("data:"):].split(";", 1)[0].strip() or "application/octet-stream"
    +    # Cheap pre-decode size gate on the encoded length (~4/3 expansion).
    +    if (len(payload) * 3) // 4 > _MAX_INGEST_BYTES:
    +        raise SourceTooLarge("data: URL exceeds size limit", src=s[:64])
    +    try:
    +        data = base64.b64decode(payload, validate=True)
    +    except Exception as exc:
    +        raise NotAnImage(f"invalid base64 in data: URL: {exc}", src=s[:64])
    +    return data, declared  # real mime verified in _finalize via magic bytes
    +
    +
    +def _http_block_reason(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
    +    """Return a human-readable block reason, or None when the URL is allowed.
    +
    +    Pre-flight short-circuit: policy-blocked URLs are refused BEFORE any
    +    network I/O. ``_download_image`` re-checks policy internally (per attempt
    +    and against the final redirect target) — that second evaluation is
    +    intentional, not redundant: this one guarantees no bytes move for a
    +    blocked URL; the inner one covers redirects and non-resolver callers.
    +    Preserves the specific website-policy message so the agent sees *why*.
    +    """
    +    from tools.url_safety import is_safe_url
    +    from tools.website_policy import check_website_access
    +
    +    if not is_safe_url(url):
    +        return "blocked: unsafe or private URL"
    +    blocked = check_website_access(url)
    +    if blocked:
    +        return blocked.get("message") or "blocked by website policy"
    +    return None
    +
    +
    +async def _download_to_bytes(url: str) -> bytes:
    +    import tempfile
    +
    +    from tools.vision_tools import _download_image
    +
    +    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".img", delete=False) as tf:
    +        tmp = Path(tf.name)
    +    try:
    +        # Enforces the 50MB stream cap, redirect SSRF guard, and website policy.
    +        await _download_image(url, tmp)
    +        return await asyncio.to_thread(tmp.read_bytes)
    +    except PermissionError as exc:  # website policy block
    +        raise SourceUnsafe(str(exc), src=url, origin="http")
    +    finally:
    +        tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
    +
    +
    +def _is_local_terminal_backend() -> bool:
    +    """True when the terminal backend runs directly on the host.
    +
    +    Mirrors ``tools.browser_tool._is_local_backend`` and terminal_tool's own
    +    dispatch, which key off ``TERMINAL_ENV``.
    +    """
    +    return os.getenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local").strip().lower() in ("local", "")
    +
    +
    +def _media_cache_roots() -> list:
    +    """Agent-managed media cache directories under HERMES_HOME (host side).
    +
    +    The only host paths vision may read under a non-local backend: gateway-
    +    downloaded inbound media and the tools' own URL-download temp dirs. Covers
    +    the consolidated ``cache/`` layout and the legacy flat directories.
    +    """
    +    from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
    +
    +    home = get_hermes_home()
    +    return [
    +        home / "cache",  # cache/images, cache/vision, cache/video(s), cache/audio
    +        home / "image_cache",
    +        home / "audio_cache",
    +        home / "video_cache",
    +        home / "temp_vision_images",
    +        home / "temp_video_files",
    +    ]
    +
    +
    +def _permitted_host_read_target(p: Path, ctx: ResolveContext) -> Optional[Path]:
    +    """Return the host path to read, or ``None`` if a host read is not permitted.
    +
    +    - Local backend: any path is permitted (chosen posture). Returns ``p``.
    +    - Non-local backend: permitted only if the path resolves inside a media
    +      cache root. A container-visible cache path (e.g. ``/root/.hermes/cache/
    +      images/x.png``) is first translated back to its host mount; anything that
    +      is not under a cache returns ``None`` so the caller routes it to the
    +      in-sandbox exec-read instead of reading the host filesystem.
    +    """
    +    if _is_local_terminal_backend():
    +        try:
    +            return p.resolve()
    +        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — unresolved path: let is_file() fail downstream
    +            return p
    +
    +    from tools.credential_files import from_agent_visible_cache_path
    +
    +    host_candidate = Path(from_agent_visible_cache_path(str(p)))
    +    try:
    +        real = host_candidate.resolve()
    +    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — cannot resolve -> not a safe host read
    +        return None
    +    for root in _media_cache_roots():
    +        try:
    +            real.relative_to(root.resolve())
    +            return real
    +        except ValueError:
    +            continue
    +    return None
    +
    +
    +def _get_active_env(task_id: Optional[str]):
    +    if not task_id:
    +        return None
    +    try:
    +        from tools.terminal_tool import get_active_env
    +
    +        return get_active_env(task_id)
    +    except Exception:
    +        return None
    +
    +
    +async def _resolve_container_fallback(p: Path, ctx: ResolveContext, src: str) -> ResolvedImage:
    +    """Read the image bytes inside the sandbox (fail-closed when none exists).
    +
    +    Reached when a host read is not permitted or the host file is absent. The
    +    agent can already ``cat`` any container file (file_operations.py reads
    +    root-owned mode-600 files this way), so this stays within the same sandbox
    +    boundary and never touches the host filesystem. ``--`` stops a leading-dash
    +    path from being parsed as a ``base64`` option; ``base64 -w0`` is GNU-only,
    +    so pipe through ``tr -d`` for BusyBox.
    +
    +    Fail-closed: if there is no active sandbox env we refuse rather than falling
    +    back to a host read, so a non-cache host path under a sandbox never leaks.
    +    """
    +    import asyncio
    +    import shlex
    +
    +    env = _get_active_env(ctx.task_id)
    +    if env is None:
    +        raise SourceNotFound(
    +            f"'{p}' is not reachable inside the sandbox and no active sandbox "
    +            f"session is available to read it",
    +            src=src, origin="container")
    +
    +    # Bound the read INSIDE the sandbox: head -c caps at ingest-limit+1 bytes
    +    # so a huge file (or /dev/zero) can't stream unbounded base64 into host
    +    # memory — the +1 byte lets us distinguish "exactly at the cap" from
    +    # "over the cap" after decode. The input redirect (< path) avoids argv
    +    # entirely, so leading-dash paths can't be parsed as options; base64
    +    # -w0 is GNU-only, so pipe through tr -d for BusyBox.
    +    # env.execute is a blocking backend exec; keep it off the event loop so a
    +    # multi-MB base64 read doesn't stall every other coroutine.
    +    qp = shlex.quote(str(p))
    +    res = await asyncio.to_thread(
    +        env.execute,
    +        f"head -c {_MAX_INGEST_BYTES + 1} < {qp} | base64 | tr -d '\\n'")
    +    if res.get("returncode", 1) != 0:
    +        raise SourceNotFound(f"could not read '{p}' inside the sandbox", src=src, origin="container")
    +    try:
    +        data = base64.b64decode(res.get("output", ""), validate=True)
    +    except Exception as exc:
    +        raise NotAnImage(f"sandbox returned non-image data for '{p}': {exc}", src=src)
    +    if len(data) > _MAX_INGEST_BYTES:
    +        raise SourceTooLarge("image exceeds size limit", src=src, origin="container")
    +    return _finalize(data, "", "container", src)
    +
    +
    +def _finalize(data: bytes, declared_mime: str, origin: str, src: str) -> ResolvedImage:
    +    """Intrinsic-correctness chokepoint: ingest byte cap + magic-byte sniff.
    +
    +    The cap here is the generous 50MB *ingest* budget, not the 20MB provider
    +    payload cap — a 20-50MB image must survive this step so the call site can
    +    resize it under the payload cap. See ``_MAX_INGEST_BYTES``.
    +    """
    +    from tools.vision_tools import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
    +
    +    if len(data) > _MAX_INGEST_BYTES:
    +        raise SourceTooLarge("image exceeds size limit", src=src, origin=origin)
    +    sniffed = _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(data)
    +    if sniffed is None:
    +        if b"<svg" in data[:4096].lower():
    +            # Pass SVG through — the vision call sites rasterize it to PNG
    +            # via _normalize_to_supported_image before embedding (providers
    +            # only ingest raster images).
    +            return ResolvedImage(data=data, mime="image/svg+xml", origin=origin)
    +        raise NotAnImage("source is not a recognized image", src=src, origin=origin)
    +    return ResolvedImage(data=data, mime=sniffed, origin=origin)

  • tools/vision_tools.py

    @@ -221,11 +221,14 @@ async def _validate_image_url_async(url: str) -> bool:
         return await async_is_safe_url(url)
     
     
    -def _detect_image_mime_type(image_path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
    -    """Return a MIME type when the file looks like a supported image."""
    -    with image_path.open("rb") as f:
    -        header = f.read(64)
    +def _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(data: bytes) -> Optional[str]:
    +    """Magic-byte MIME sniff on raw bytes (authoritative; no extension trust).
     
    +    Returns ``None`` for anything without a recognized image header — including
    +    SVG, which has no magic bytes. The resolver special-cases SVG (sniffs
    +    ``<svg``) and passes it through for rasterization at the call sites.
    +    """
    +    header = data[:64]
         if header.startswith(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n"):
             return "image/png"
         if header.startswith(b"\xff\xd8\xff"):
    @@ -236,13 +239,125 @@ def _detect_image_mime_type(image_path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
             return "image/bmp"
         if len(header) >= 12 and header[:4] == b"RIFF" and header[8:12] == b"WEBP":
             return "image/webp"
    -    if image_path.suffix.lower() == ".svg":
    -        head = image_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")[:4096].lower()
    -        if "<svg" in head:
    -            return "image/svg+xml"
         return None
     
     
    +# Media types the major vision providers (Anthropic in particular) accept for
    +# inline base64 images.  Anything outside this set — SVG, BMP, TIFF, etc. — is
    +# rejected with a non-retryable 400.  Because a vision tool-result is baked into
    +# immutable conversation history and re-sent every turn, embedding an
    +# unsupported media_type permanently wedges the session (retries re-send the
    +# same bad bytes).  We MUST normalize to one of these before embedding.
    +_ANTHROPIC_SUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPES = frozenset(
    +    {"image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/gif", "image/webp"}
    +)
    +
    +
    +def _rasterize_svg_to_png(svg_path: Path, out_path: Path) -> bool:
    +    """Best-effort SVG → PNG rasterization. Returns True on success.
    +
    +    Tries, in order: cairosvg, svglib+reportlab, then system rasterizers
    +    (rsvg-convert, inkscape).  All are soft dependencies; if none is available
    +    we return False and the caller rejects the image with an actionable error
    +    rather than embedding an unsupported media_type that would wedge the
    +    session.
    +    """
    +    # 1) cairosvg (pure-python-ish, most common)
    +    try:
    +        import cairosvg  # type: ignore
    +        cairosvg.svg2png(url=str(svg_path), write_to=str(out_path))
    +        return out_path.exists() and out_path.stat().st_size > 0
    +    except Exception:
    +        pass
    +    # 2) svglib + reportlab
    +    try:
    +        from svglib.svglib import svg2rlg  # type: ignore
    +        from reportlab.graphics import renderPM  # type: ignore
    +        drawing = svg2rlg(str(svg_path))
    +        if drawing is not None:
    +            renderPM.drawToFile(drawing, str(out_path), fmt="PNG")
    +            return out_path.exists() and out_path.stat().st_size > 0
    +    except Exception:
    +        pass
    +    # 3) system rasterizers
    +    import shutil as _shutil
    +    import subprocess as _subprocess
    +    for cmd in (
    +        ["rsvg-convert", "-o", str(out_path), str(svg_path)],
    +        ["inkscape", str(svg_path), "--export-type=png",
    +         f"--export-filename={out_path}"],
    +    ):
    +        if _shutil.which(cmd[0]):
    +            try:
    +                _subprocess.run(
    +                    cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=30,
    +                    stdin=_subprocess.DEVNULL,
    +                )
    +                if out_path.exists() and out_path.stat().st_size > 0:
    +                    return True
    +            except Exception:
    +                continue
    +    return False
    +
    +
    +def _normalize_to_supported_image(
    +    image_path: Path, detected_mime: str
    +) -> tuple[Optional[Path], Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
    +    """Ensure an image is in a vision-provider-supported format.
    +
    +    Returns a 3-tuple ``(path, mime, error)``:
    +      - If ``detected_mime`` is already supported: ``(image_path, detected_mime, None)``.
    +      - If conversion succeeds: ``(new_png_path, "image/png", None)`` — the new
    +        path is a temp file the CALLER must clean up.
    +      - If conversion is impossible: ``(None, None, <error message>)``.
    +
    +    SVG is rasterized to PNG (best-effort, soft deps).  Other raster formats
    +    Pillow can read (BMP, TIFF, etc.) are re-encoded to PNG.  This runs BEFORE
    +    the image is base64-embedded into conversation history, so an unsupported
    +    media_type can never reach the provider and wedge the session.
    +    """
    +    if detected_mime in _ANTHROPIC_SUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPES:
    +        return image_path, detected_mime, None
    +
    +    out_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
    +    out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    +    out_path = out_dir / f"converted_{uuid.uuid4()}.png"
    +
    +    # SVG: needs a rasterizer (Pillow cannot render SVG).
    +    if detected_mime == "image/svg+xml":
    +        if _rasterize_svg_to_png(image_path, out_path):
    +            return out_path, "image/png", None
    +        return (
    +            None,
    +            None,
    +            "This is an SVG, which vision models cannot read directly, and no "
    +            "SVG rasterizer is installed (tried cairosvg, svglib, rsvg-convert, "
    +            "inkscape). Convert the SVG to PNG first — e.g. open it in a browser "
    +            "and screenshot it, or install a rasterizer "
    +            "(`pip install cairosvg`) — then re-run vision_analyze on the PNG.",
    +        )
    +
    +    # Other non-supported raster formats (BMP, TIFF, ...): re-encode via Pillow.
    +    try:
    +        from PIL import Image as _PILImage
    +        with _PILImage.open(image_path) as _img:
    +            if _img.mode not in ("RGB", "RGBA", "L"):
    +                _img = _img.convert("RGBA")
    +            _img.save(out_path, format="PNG")
    +        if out_path.exists() and out_path.stat().st_size > 0:
    +            return out_path, "image/png", None
    +    except Exception as _exc:
    +        logger.warning("Failed to normalize %s image to PNG: %s",
    +                       detected_mime, _exc)
    +    return (
    +        None,
    +        None,
    +        f"Image format {detected_mime!r} is not supported by the vision API "
    +        f"and could not be converted to PNG (install Pillow for raster "
    +        f"conversion). Convert it to PNG or JPEG and try again.",
    +    )
    +
    +
     def _is_retryable_download_error(error: Exception) -> bool:
         """Return True only for transient image-download failures worth retrying.
     
    @@ -817,13 +932,14 @@ async def _vision_concurrency_slot():
     async def _vision_analyze_native(
         image_url: str,
         question: str,
    +    task_id: Optional[str] = None,
     ) -> Any:
         """Fast path for vision-capable main models.
     
    -    Loads the image (local file OR remote URL), base64-encodes it, and
    -    returns a multimodal tool-result envelope. The agent loop unwraps it;
    -    provider adapters serialize it into the right tool-result-with-image
    -    shape for each backend.
    +    Loads the image (data: / http(s) / file:// / local path / sandbox-container
    +    path) via the unified resolver, base64-encodes it, and returns a multimodal
    +    tool-result envelope. The agent loop unwraps it; provider adapters serialize
    +    it into the right tool-result-with-image shape for each backend.
     
         Returns:
             A ``_multimodal`` envelope dict on success.
    @@ -840,38 +956,51 @@ async def _vision_analyze_native(
             if is_interrupted():
                 return tool_error("Interrupted", success=False)
     
    -        # Resolve the image source (mirrors vision_analyze_tool's logic
    -        # exactly so behaviour is consistent).
    -        resolved_url = image_url
    -        if resolved_url.startswith("file://"):
    -            resolved_url = resolved_url[len("file://"):]
    -        local_path = Path(os.path.expanduser(resolved_url))
    -
    -        if local_path.is_file():
    -            temp_image_path = local_path
    -            should_cleanup = False
    -        elif await _validate_image_url_async(image_url):
    -            blocked = check_website_access(image_url)
    -            if blocked:
    -                return tool_error(blocked["message"], success=False)
    -            temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
    -            temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.jpg"
    -            await _download_image(image_url, temp_image_path)
    -            should_cleanup = True
    -        else:
    -            return tool_error(
    -                "Invalid image source. Provide an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a "
    -                "valid local file path.",
    -                success=False,
    -            )
    +        # Resolve the source to raw bytes through the single resolver (unifies
    +        # data:/http/file/local/container and enforces terminal-backend
    +        # confinement). Materialize to a temp file so the existing path-based
    +        # encode/resize/embed-cap pipeline below is reused verbatim.
    +        from tools.image_source import (
    +            ImageResolutionError,
    +            ResolveContext,
    +            resolve_image_source,
    +        )
     
    -        image_size_bytes = temp_image_path.stat().st_size
    -        detected_mime_type = _detect_image_mime_type(temp_image_path)
    -        if not detected_mime_type:
    +        try:
    +            resolved = await resolve_image_source(image_url, ResolveContext(task_id=task_id))
    +        except ImageResolutionError as exc:
    +            return tool_error(str(exc), success=False)
    +
    +        detected_mime_type = resolved.mime
    +        image_size_bytes = len(resolved.data)
    +        temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
    +        temp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    +        temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.img"
    +        await asyncio.to_thread(temp_image_path.write_bytes, resolved.data)
    +        should_cleanup = True
    +
    +        # Normalize unsupported formats (SVG, BMP, ...) to PNG BEFORE embedding.
    +        # Anthropic only accepts jpeg/png/gif/webp; an unsupported media_type
    +        # baked into immutable history wedges the session with a 400 on every
    +        # resume.  Convert here so it can never enter history. Offloaded — the
    +        # rasterizers/Pillow are blocking.
    +        normalized_path, detected_mime_type, _norm_err = await asyncio.to_thread(
    +            _normalize_to_supported_image, temp_image_path, detected_mime_type,
    +        )
    +        if _norm_err or normalized_path is None:
                 return tool_error(
    -                "Only real image files are supported for vision analysis.",
    -                success=False,
    +                _norm_err or "Image normalization failed.", success=False,
                 )
    +        if normalized_path != temp_image_path:
    +            # We created a temp PNG — swap to it and ensure it's cleaned up.
    +            if should_cleanup and temp_image_path.exists():
    +                try:
    +                    temp_image_path.unlink()
    +                except Exception:
    +                    pass
    +            temp_image_path = normalized_path
    +            should_cleanup = True
    +            image_size_bytes = temp_image_path.stat().st_size
     
             image_data_url = await _run_encode_on_cpu_executor(
                 _image_to_base64_data_url,
    @@ -935,6 +1064,7 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
         image_url: str,
         user_prompt: str,
         model: str = None,
    +    task_id: Optional[str] = None,
     ) -> str:
         """
         Analyze an image from a URL or local file path using vision AI.
    @@ -996,42 +1126,50 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
     
             logger.info("Analyzing image: %s", image_url[:60])
             logger.info("User prompt: %s", user_prompt[:100])
    -        
    -        # Determine if this is a local file path or a remote URL
    -        # Strip file:// scheme so file URIs resolve as local paths.
    -        resolved_url = image_url
    -        if resolved_url.startswith("file://"):
    -            resolved_url = resolved_url[len("file://"):]
    -        local_path = Path(os.path.expanduser(resolved_url))
    -        if local_path.is_file():
    -            # Local file path (e.g. from platform image cache) -- skip download
    -            logger.info("Using local image file: %s", image_url)
    -            temp_image_path = local_path
    -            should_cleanup = False  # Don't delete cached/local files
    -        elif await _validate_image_url_async(image_url):
    -            # Remote URL -- download to a temporary location
    -            blocked = check_website_access(image_url)
    -            if blocked:
    -                raise PermissionError(blocked["message"])
    -            logger.info("Downloading image from URL...")
    -            temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
    -            temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.jpg"
    -            await _download_image(image_url, temp_image_path)
    -            should_cleanup = True
    -        else:
    -            raise ValueError(
    -                "Invalid image source. Provide an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a valid local file path."
    -            )
    -        
    +
    +        # Resolve the source to raw bytes through the single resolver (unifies
    +        # data:/http/file/local/container and enforces terminal-backend
    +        # confinement). Materialize to a temp file so the existing path-based
    +        # encode/resize pipeline below is reused verbatim.
    +        from tools.image_source import (
    +            ImageResolutionError,
    +            ResolveContext,
    +            resolve_image_source,
    +        )
    +
    +        try:
    +            resolved = await resolve_image_source(image_url, ResolveContext(task_id=task_id))
    +        except ImageResolutionError as exc:
    +            raise ValueError(str(exc))
    +
    +        detected_mime_type = resolved.mime
    +        temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
    +        temp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    +        temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.img"
    +        await asyncio.to_thread(temp_image_path.write_bytes, resolved.data)
    +        should_cleanup = True
    +
             # Get image file size for logging
    -        image_size_bytes = temp_image_path.stat().st_size
    +        image_size_bytes = len(resolved.data)
             image_size_kb = image_size_bytes / 1024
             logger.info("Image ready (%.1f KB)", image_size_kb)
    +        # Normalize unsupported formats (SVG, BMP, ...) to PNG. Vision providers
    +        # reject these media types; convert before encoding. Offloaded — the
    +        # rasterizers/Pillow are blocking.
    +        normalized_path, detected_mime_type, _norm_err = await asyncio.to_thread(
    +            _normalize_to_supported_image, temp_image_path, detected_mime_type,
    +        )
    +        if _norm_err or normalized_path is None:
    +            raise ValueError(_norm_err or "Image normalization failed.")
    +        if normalized_path != temp_image_path:
    +            if should_cleanup and temp_image_path.exists():
    +                try:
    +                    temp_image_path.unlink()
    +                except Exception:
    +                    pass
    +            temp_image_path = normalized_path
    +            should_cleanup = True
     
    -        detected_mime_type = _detect_image_mime_type(temp_image_path)
    -        if not detected_mime_type:
    -            raise ValueError("Only real image files are supported for vision analysis.")
    -        
             # Convert image to base64 — send at full resolution first.
             # If the provider rejects it as too large, we auto-resize and retry.
             # Offloaded to the bounded vision CPU executor so a fan-out of encodes
    @@ -1335,6 +1473,7 @@ def check_vision_requirements() -> bool:
     async def _handle_vision_analyze(args: Dict[str, Any], **kw: Any) -> str:
         image_url = args.get("image_url", "")
         question = args.get("question", "")
    +    task_id = kw.get("task_id")
     
         # The fan-out cap lives inside the encode/resize step (offloaded to the
         # bounded _vision_cpu_executor), NOT around the whole analysis — so a
    @@ -1349,7 +1488,7 @@ async def _handle_vision_analyze(args: Dict[str, Any], **kw: Any) -> str:
         # information loss, no extra latency.
         if _should_use_native_vision_fast_path():
             logger.info("vision_analyze: native fast path")
    -        return await _vision_analyze_native(image_url, question)
    +        return await _vision_analyze_native(image_url, question, task_id=task_id)
     
         # Legacy path: aux LLM describes the image and we return its text.
         full_prompt = (
    @@ -1368,7 +1507,7 @@ async def _handle_vision_analyze(args: Dict[str, Any], **kw: Any) -> str:
             pass
         if not model:
             model = os.getenv("AUXILIARY_VISION_MODEL", "").strip() or None
    -    return await vision_analyze_tool(image_url, full_prompt, model)
    +    return await vision_analyze_tool(image_url, full_prompt, model, task_id=task_id)
     
     
     registry.register(