# NousResearch/hermes-agent · Dashboard WebSocket fixes for reverse-proxy and insecure modes ## Open now - Nothing open on GitHub. These issues and pull requests address regressions in dashboard WebSocket connectivity and action-status polling that affected reverse-proxy deployments and insecure public bind configurations. The work involves opt-in auth handling and restoring access broken around v0.14.0. ## TL;DR - 4 member(s): 0 open issue(s), 1 closed issue(s), 0 open PR(s), 1 merged PR(s), 2 PR(s) closed without merging. - A fix was merged to main in PR #35141. Verify it addresses your case. - **Recommended:** read PR #35141 (and any competing PRs below) before filing. Confirm the merged change covers your symptom. ## Maintainer resolution verdict - Internal-tracker verdict over this cluster's issue members: `resolved` · deciding PR(s): `pr-35141`. This is distinct from the fix status above. Weigh it yourself. ## How this cluster was grouped - Link evidence (`STRUCTURAL_SPANNING`): every member is connected by structural evidence: shared changed files, or a closing/superseded reference. - Pairwise link density `0.50`: the share of member pairs that carry a link, counting a structural link in full and a relevance-only link at 0.36. `1.00` means every pair is linked. ## Closed / duplicate issues - #34227: v0.14.0 dashboard breaks behind reverse proxies — two regressions ## Prior & competing PRs - **#34307: fix(dashboard): restore reverse-proxy WS access and action-status polling in --insecure mode**. closed without merge · fix tier `suggested` - maintainer direction: category `implemented_elsewhere`; implication `superseded` - _suggested-tier fix detail withheld; re-request with `?tier=all` to include it._ - **#35141: fix(dashboard): allow chat websockets on insecure public bind (salvage #33278)**. merged to main · fix tier `verified` - maintainer direction: category `merged` - files: `hermes_cli/web_server.py`, `scripts/release.py`, `tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py` - fix hunks: - `hermes_cli/web_server.py` ```diff @@ -3371,10 +3371,15 @@ class PtyUnavailableError(RuntimeError): # type: ignore[no-redef] def _ws_client_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool: """Check if the WebSocket client IP is acceptable. - Loopback mode: only loopback clients allowed — the legacy + Loopback bind: only loopback clients allowed — the legacy ``?token=[redacted:secret-assignment] path is the only auth we have, so we don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens. + All-interfaces insecure bind (``--host 0.0.0.0 --insecure`` or + ``--host :: --insecure``): allow any peer. The operator explicitly + opted into LAN/public exposure in this mode, so the loopback-only peer + restriction should not apply. + Gated mode: any peer is allowed — uvicorn's ``proxy_headers=True`` (enabled when the OAuth gate is active so cookies can pick up ``X-Forwarded-Proto``) rewrites ``ws.client.host`` to the ``` ```diff @@ -3385,6 +3390,9 @@ def _ws_client_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool: """ if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False): return True + bound_host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") + if bound_host in {"0.0.0.0", "::"}: + return True client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else "" if not client_host: return True ``` - `scripts/release.py` ```diff @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ # Auto-extracted from noreply emails + manual overrides AUTHOR_MAP = { + "[redacted:email]": "SeaXen", "[redacted:email]": "HashClawAI", "[redacted:email]": "TonyPepeBear", "[redacted:email]": "nielskaspers", ``` - `tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py` ```diff @@ -80,6 +80,25 @@ def loopback_app(): web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required [redacted:email] +def insecure_public_app(): + """web_server.app configured for all-interfaces insecure mode.""" + _reset_for_tests() + clear_providers() + prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None) + prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None) + prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None) + web_server.app.state.bound_host = "0.0.0.0" + web_server.app.state.bound_port = 9120 + web_server.app.state.auth_required = False + client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="http://192.168.0.222:9120") + yield client + _reset_for_tests() + web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host + web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port + web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required + + def _logged_in(client: TestClient) -> None: """Drive the stub OAuth round trip so the client holds session cookies.""" r1 = client.get("/auth/login?provider=stub", follow_redirects=False) ``` ```diff @@ -281,6 +300,21 @@ def test_loopback_peer_allowed_in_loopback_mode(self, loopback_app): ws.headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:8080"} assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is True + def test_non_loopback_peer_allowed_in_insecure_public_mode(self, insecure_public_app): + """`--host 0.0.0.0 --insecure` is an explicit LAN/public opt-in. + + Regression coverage for the dashboard `/chat` breakage where the + HTML shell loaded on 9120 but every WebSocket upgrade was rejected + with 403 because the loopback-only peer guard still ran even though + the operator intentionally exposed the dashboard on all interfaces. + """ + ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="192.168.0.55") + ws.headers = { + "host": "192.168.0.222:9120", + "origin": "http://192.168.0.222:9120", + } + assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is True + def test_host_origin_guard_still_runs_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app): """Bypassing the peer-IP check must not bypass the DNS-rebinding Host header guard — that one still protects against attacker ``` - **#34370: fix(dashboard): WS auth opt-in for reverse-proxy deployments (#34227)**. closed without merge - maintainer direction: category `implemented_elsewhere`; implication `superseded`; refs `#34307`, `#34227`, `#34370` ## Fix status - Merged to main in PR #35141 (cited above). No release data is tracked. Verify downstream. - Fix last verified (merged) `2026-05-30`. - Subsystem: `dashboard`