NousResearch/hermes-agent
Prompt injection defense via untrusted tool names
Cluster 98587 · agent. Data as of
2 open items. Fix attempted, not merged.
The short answer
1open issue
1open PR
3items grouped
- Known?
- Yes. 3 related items grouped here, 0 issues already closed.
- Fix event
- No fix has been merged to main. 1 PR closed without merging; see the attempts below.
- Tracker
- The maintainers' tracker marks this
unresolved. That is separate from the fix event. - Still open
- 1 issue and 1 PR.
Next step: read the attempts below. Your case may extend or revive that work.
Pick up a Lab taskThese items address gaps in prompt-injection defenses by expanding _UNTRUSTED_TOOL_NAMES to cover terminal, execute_code, and skill_view, and by restricting how external content reaches the agent through web-cache reads, shell commands, and network code.
Open issues1
- Issue#98587_UNTRUSTED_TOOL_NAMES doesn't cover terminal/execute_code/skill_view — indirect prompt injection can land through these tools too
Open PRs1
- PR#101597fix(security): frame side-door external content — web-cache reads, fetching shell commands, network code
1 PR closed without merging
From the close comments: other 1
-
#98663 fix(security): add terminal/execute_code/skill_view to _UNTRUSTED_TOOL_NAMES for prompt-injection defense · other →
#98587
How this cluster was grouped
-
Link evidence (
structural links throughout): every member is connected by structural evidence: shared changed files, or a closing/superseded reference. -
Pairwise link density
0.67: the share of item pairs that carry a link, counting a structural link in full and a relevance-only link at 0.36.1.00means every pair is linked.
Pick up a Lab task
Check whether a fix covers the open issues here, with your own agent. Bring back evidence for maintainers.
Open the LabAt a glance
- Subsystem
- agent
- Closed issues
- 0
- Attempts
- 1 PR closed without merging